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Abstract 
 
Dynamic, decentralized market environments provide natural means for signaling quality 
through higher prices that are accepted less frequently. High qualities trade even when 
average quality is low. The lemons problem is rendered less pronounced. Informative 
equilibria are simple. The lowest price is accepted immediately, the higher ones with 
increasing delays. Separating equilibria satisfy the Intuitive Criterion and feature the 
Diamond paradox. The sellers extract the full surplus of trading their quality and push the 
buyers to their continuation values. Since all qualities trade, the decentralized equilibrium 
may generate more welfare than the competitive benchmark – even as frictions vanish. 
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1 Introduction
This note revisits the classic lemons problem. If there is asymmetric information on
qualities and low quality on average, high quality is not traded in competitive equilibrium
(Akerlof, 1970). There is adverse selection. Some mutually beneficial trades are not
consummated.
It ought to be noted, however, that many markets are dynamic and decentralized –
not static and centralized as in the standard model. There is trade between different
buyers and sellers at diverse locations at distinct times. Sellers are rarely price takers,
and markets seldom clear instantly. Communication possibilities are richer.
We demonstrate that, if trade is dynamic and decentralized, there are simple means
for transmitting quality information. Sellers can signal high quality by setting higher
prices which are accepted less frequently. Since waiting costs, the sellers of low quality
choose lower prices and higher liquidity instead. The lemons problem is less pronounced.
Welfare improves and its division is different. As surplus changes are of obvious interest,
we show a few examples. The centralized benchmark may exaggerate inefficiency.
Yet, it is not straightforward to contrast the efficiency of centralized and decentralized
markets. There is no decentralized benchmark. Inderst and Müller (2002), for instance,
analyze a stylized sorting game. Moreno and Wooders (2010, MW hereafter) present
more concrete a screening game, and we consider a signaling game.
To compare welfare, we build on MW. In their setup, buyers offer prices and sellers
either accept them or resume their search. Given the order of moves, buyers have to
randomize over low and high price proposals to tell qualities apart. Since high prices
are accepted by all sellers, full separation is impossible. Average quality is elevated as
high quality circulates longer. The sellers of low quality extract all surplus.
We adopt the setup in MW but we change the order of moves and allow for more
than two types. The signaling approach has natural appeal. It is the sellers who set
the prices in many markets. Interestingly, we find that all sellers receive positive profits.
Separating equilibria have a clear characterization given by the Diamond paradox. Full
separation can be achieved by pure and purified strategies (Harsanyi, 1973).
The structure of this note is the following. We build the setup in Section 2. In
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Section 3, we characterize separating equilibria. In Section 4, we zoom in on the model
by MW. We show that there exists a separating signaling equilibrium that satisfies the
Intuitive Criterion and we compare welfare between the competitive market and the
screening and signaling markets. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Setup
Consider a large market in discrete time. Each period a mass unity of both buyers and
sellers enter the market. They have unit demands and unit supplies of a good whose
quality x is known to the seller but not to the buyer. The distribution of entering
qualities is represented by density g(x) bounded by {x, x} ∈ suppg(x) ⊂ [x, x].
There are gains from trade. The buyers value the goods more than the sellers. The
buyer values uB and the seller reservation values uS are given by
uB(x) > uS(x) for all x,
where uB and uS are strictly increasing. There is a lemons problem. The expected buyer
value is below the high quality seller reservation value
E(uB(x)) < uS(x).
The payoffs are linear in prices p. The discount factor is δ < 1.
A buyer is matched with a seller with probability µ. If matched in period t, the seller
of quality x offers price p with probability βt(p|x), and the buyer forms belief pit(x|p)
about quality x based on price p and accepts it with probability αt(p). The price offers
are not observable to the outsiders. The same seller and buyer almost never meet again.
Those who trade exit the market.
Trade takes place if a seller and a buyer meet and if the seller offers a price that the
buyer accepts
τt(x) = µ
ˆ uB(x)
uS(x)
αt(p)βt(p|x)dp.
The stock of sellers of quality x evolves as
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Γt+1(x) = (1− τt(x))Γt(x) + g(x).
A mass g(x) of new sellers enters the market, and a mass τt(x)Γt(x) of old sellers exits
the market.
If a buyer and a seller trade, they receive the payoffs Bt(p) = Et(uB(x)|p) − p and
S(p|x) = p − uS(x) respectively. Otherwise, they continue the search. As a result, the
continuation values are given by
V Bt = µ
ˆ uB(x)
uS(x)
[
αt(p)Bt(p) + (1− αt(p))δV Bt+1
]
βt(p)dp+ (1− µ)δV Bt+1,
V St (x) = µ
ˆ uB(x)
uS(x)
[
αt(p)S(p|x) + (1− αt(p))δV St+1(x)
]
βt(p|x)dp+ (1− µ)δV St+1(x),
for buyers and sellers in the order given.
3 Separating equilibria
We characterize separating Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria (PBE).
Definition 1. A PBE is a 6-tuple
(
β(x), αt, pit,Γt(x), V
B
t , V
S
t (x)
)
t
, where the
strategies βt(x) and αt are sequentially rational everywhere, and the beliefs pit, the stocks
Γt(x) and the continuation values V Bt and V St (x) are consistent with the strategies on
the equilibrium path.
Definition 2. A PBE is separating if the supports of strategies suppβt(x) are
disjoint almost everywhere.
Buyers choose acceptance rates, αt(p), and sellers choose prices, pt(x). They maxi-
mize.
V Bt (p) = max
αt∈[0,1]
[
αt(Et(u
B(x)|p)− p) + (1− αt)δV Bt+1
]
, (1)
V St (x) = max
p∈[uS(x),uB(x)]
[
αt(p)(p− uS(x)) + (1− αt(p))δV St+1(x)
]
. (2)
Rearranging, (2) can be expressed as
V St (x) = maxp
[
ft(p, x)(p− uS(x))
]
, (3)
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where ft is defined as
ft(p, x) :=
αt(p)
1− δ(V St+1(x)/V St (x))(1− αt(p))
.
The function ft captures the “endogenous discount factor”, δ(V St+1(x)/V St (x))(1−αt(p)),
which obtains since sellers can affect whether the game stops or continues. It is increasing
in αt, zero at αt(p) = 0 and one at αt(p) = 1.
Based on (3), the incentive constraints for sellers of quality x can be presented as
ft(p, x)(p− uS(x)) ≥ ft(p′, x)(p′ − uS(x)) (4)
for all p ∈ suppβt(x) and all p′ ∈ [uS(x), uB(x)].
(4) implies that the sellers of the lowest quality must receive positive profits (if
higher prices are to be accepted) and buyers must accept higher prices more rarely
(with probability less than one).
Therefore, to support randomized strategies, buyers have to be indifferent between
accepting and rejecting higher prices. Given (1) and given that beliefs need to be correct
on the equilibrium path, higher prices satisfy
pt(x) = u
B(x)− δV Bt+1 for x > x. (5)
Obviously, the out-of-equilibrium-path beliefs cannot be harsher for the sellers of
the lowest quality than the equilibrium-path beliefs. As a result, the sellers have a
profitable deviation either upward (to higher prices) or downward (to higher acceptance
rates) unless their prices are both as high as possible
pt(x) = y(x)− δV Bt+1 (6)
and accepted certainly
αt(pt(x)) = 1.
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Intuitively, buyers need to mix for sellers to reveal quality, and sellers need to extract
loose surplus for buyers to mix.
Moreover, since (5) and (6) must hold for all periods t, buyers have to be constantly
indifferent between stopping and continuing,
V Bt = u
B(x)− pt(x) = δV Bt+1 = δ(uB(x)− pt+1(x)) for all (x, t).
It follows that either buyer continuation values are rising and prices falling,
V Bt < V
B
t+1 and pt(x) > pt+1(x) for all (x, t),
or buyers do not receive surplus,
V Bt = 0 for all t.
Proposition 1. In a separating PBE,
(a) (seller strategies) sellers extract all loose surplus, pt(x) = y(x)− δV Bt+1 for all x,
(b) (buyer strategies) buyers accept the lowest price immediately, αt(pt(x)) = 1, and
higher prices with increasing delays, αt(pt(x)) > αt(pt(y)) for x < y.
(c) In a stationary separating PBE, buyer continuation values are zero, V Bt = 0
for all t.
(d) In a non-stationary separating PBE, buyer continuation values are increasing,
V Bt < V
B
t+1 for all t.
Proof. Above. 
Separating equilibria feature pure strategies for sellers and mixed or purified strate-
gies for buyers (Harsanyi, 1973). If buyer reservation values are uncertain, individuals
need not randomize. The chances that a random buyer accepts a high price only have
to be low enough. Higher quality must be less liquid.
In stationary separating equilibria, the Diamond paradox (the equilibrium price is the
monopoly price; Diamond, 1971) arises for the usual reason, the search costs. Consider
a candidate equilibrium. Take the best deal that sellers propose to buyers. All agents
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know that other deals are worse and waiting is costly. Thus, sellers can worsen the
best deal until they extract all buyer surplus. In non-stationary separating equilibria,
however, buyer surplus is positive and prices decreasing. Price fluctuations would require
pooling.
4 Example
To give examples of separating equilibria, we concentrate on the specification by MW.
There are two qualities. The costs of producing and the utilities from consuming a
good of either low or high quality are given by uS(x) = c, uS(x) = c, uB(x) = u,
and uB(x) = u respectively. There are gains from trade and potential for the lemons
problem: c < u < c < u.
Proposition 2. There are stationary, separating PBE that satisfy the Intuitive
Criterion. They consist of strategies p(x) = u, p(x) = u, α(p(x)) = 1 and
α(p(x))
1−δ(1−α(p(x))) ≤ p(x)−cp(x)−c , stocks Γ(x) = f(x)µ and Γ(x) = f(x)µα(p(x)) and values V B = 0,
V S(x) = µ(p(x)−c)1−δ+µδ and V
S(x) = µ(p(x)−c)α(p(x))1−δ+µδα(p(x)) .
Proof. Based on Proposition 1 and direct calculation. The Intuitive Criterion (Cho
and Kreps, 1987) does not restrict the out-of-equilibrium-path beliefs for prices in [c, u)
because both seller types can benefit from such deviations under favorable beliefs (the
sellers of high quality attain an increased acceptance rate, the sellers of low quality
receive an increased price). As a consequence, the deviations can be made unattractive
by postulating that, for example, pi(x|p) = 0 for p ∈ [c, u). For the lower prices, however,
the Intuitive Criterion implies that pi(x|p) = 0 for p ∈ [c, u) since sellers never price below
costs. 
We compare the welfare between the competitive market and two differently arranged
decentralized markets, one with screening (as in MW) and the other one with signaling
(as in Proposition 2). Of course, if average quality is high, the centralized benchmark is
efficient. Separation is inefficient since delay costs.
However, if average quality is low, the surplus in the competitive market is
Scom = f(x)(u− c)
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and, according to MW, the surplus in the screening market is
Sscr = f(x)
(u− c)
δ
.
Both are received by low quality sellers. Instead, given Proposition 2, the surplus in the
best signaling market is
Ssig = f(x)
(u− c)µ
1− δ + δµ + f(x)
(u− c)µα(δ)
1− δ + δµα(δ) ,
where α(δ) := (1−δ)r1−δr and r :=
u−c
u−c . It is the weighted sum of both low and high quality
seller profits.
Clearly, the relative performance of the markets depends on the parameters. The
signaling market can overcome the other markets, and they can beat it. Moreover,
welfare and its division vary substantially. The findings are illustrated in Table 1. The
first row shows, for instance, that in the parametrization used by MW the surplus is the
highest in the screening market (0.178).
c u c u f(x) f(x) µ δ Scom Sscr Ssig
0.20 0.40 0.60 1.00 0.80 0.20 0.67 0.90 0.160 0.178 0.167
0.20 0.40 0.60 1.00 0.80 0.20 1.00 0.95 0.160 0.168 0.180
0.10 0.20 0.50 1.00 0.70 0.30 0.85 0.85 0.070 0.082 0.083
0.25 0.45 0.65 1.00 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.90 0.134 0.149 0.165
0.25 0.45 0.65 0.70 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.80 0.133 0.167 0.127
Table 1. Surplus comparisons for low average quality (parameters on the left, sur-
pluses on the right).
Interestingly, decentralized trade can generate more surplus than centralized trade.
The search frictions and the momentary market power pertaining to decentralized en-
vironments can bring about considerable welfare improvements. Frictions and pricing
power not only undermine efficiency. They can mediate the separation of qualities.
Nonetheless, the welfare in the screening market approaches that in the competitive
market, as frictions diminish, whereas the welfare in the signaling market surpasses
them.
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lim
δ→1
Sscr(δ) = f(x)(u− c),
lim
δ→1
Ssig(δ) = f(x)(u− c) + f(x)(u− c)
µ r1−r
(1 + µ r1−r )
.
5 Conclusions
We demonstrate that natural signaling possibilities arise when sellers can affect prices
and trading takes time. There are separating equilibria and they have a simple char-
acterization. Despite the Diamond paradox, we find that the signaling market may
produce more welfare than both the alternative screening market and the competitive
benchmark, though there is no general welfare order between the three. The signaling
market generates the highest surplus as frictions vanish.
There is a caveat to this way of tackling the lemons problem, however: although high
quality is traded under exogenous entry, there exists no equilibrium in which it is traded
under endogenous entry, i.e. if the sellers can choose whether to enter with low or high
quality. Old remedies, e.g. warranties, information disclosure, or reputation build-up,
may come in handy.
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